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Today, April 28, 2015, the U.S. Supreme
Court will hear oral argument in the biggest
case of the term, Obergefell v. Hodges, in
which it will weigh in on the controversy
over samesex marriage that has raged for
more than twenty years.
The case is actually four cases, each arising
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit: Obergefell v. Hodges (Ohio),
Tanco v. Haslam (Tennessee), DeBoer v. Snyder (Michigan), and Bourke v. Beshear
(Kentucky). In each case, a federal district court invalidated the applicable state ban on
celebration of marriages by samesex couples, a ban on recognition of those marriages, or
both. All four rulings were overturned on appeal
(http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellatecourts/ca6/145291/145291201411
06.html) by the Sixth Circuit—the only federal appellate court to date to rule against the

right to marry for samesex couples. The Supreme Court consolidated the four cases and
rephrased the questions they presented. It agreed to answer the following questions:
Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two
people of the same sex?
Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between
two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and
performed out of state?
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/28/interstatemarriagerecognitionwhenhistorymeetsthesupremecourt
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Most of the attention to this case has focused on the first of the two questions, which is at
the heart of the controversy. That question will turn on whether the states can offer
sufficiently important reasons to justify excluding one set of couples from the right to
marry. Rather than adding to the discussion of the $64,000 question, which has received
ample analysis from many sources, I’ll focus here on the validity of bans on interstate
recognition. This latter question involves an entirely different kind of constitutional
argument, one that is likely to turn in large part on history, which I will explain in this
column.
The Law of Interstate Marriage Recognition
The Supreme Court separated the questions presented because the celebration of
marriage within a state’s borders and interstate recognition of marriages celebrated
elsewhere are governed by two completely separate bodies of law—this has been the case
throughout history. Celebration laws are a reflection of the state’s policies about who
should be permitted to marry; recognition laws are a reflection of the state’s willingness
to respect a different decision made by another state.
Although recent decades have been a period of relative calm, states historically had sharp
and longstanding disagreements about who should be permitted to marry and under
what circumstances. At various points in history, states disagreed, among other things,
about the permissibility of marriage by minors, interracial marriage, marriage by those
carrying a communicable disease, marriage between more distant relatives or between
individuals related by marriage, and commonlaw marriage.
Though the full history of these disagreements is too complicated to describe here, courts
developed a few general principles to guide them through the morass of conflicts that
arose because of the differing state marriage laws. These principles, by and large, were
not dictated by constitutional principles or mandates, but by the common law principle of
comity—respect for the actions of other states.
States acknowledged that, in some cases, they might give effect to a marriage that their
own laws would prohibit and would have invalidated if it had been performed in their
own state. Most followed the “place of celebration” rule, which means that a marriage
that is valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. (Conversely, a marriage that was void
where celebrated was void everywhere.)
But the rule is not absolute. Historically, there were two exceptions. States could refuse
recognition to an outofstate marriage if it violated either “natural law” or the state’s
“positive law.”
Under the “natural law” exception, courts tended to refuse recognition to marriages that
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/28/interstatemarriagerecognitionwhenhistorymeetsthesupremecourt
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were considered universally abhorrent—polygamous unions or incestuous ones between
close relatives. In an early New York case, the court articulated this exception as
permitting nonrecognition for marriages that are “offensive to the public sense of
morality to a degree regarded generally with abhorrence.”
Under the “positive law” exception, courts refused recognition to marriages when the
legislature had not only prohibited celebration of a particular marriage, but had
specifically provided that marriages of that type should not be given extraterritorial
effect. For the most part, state marriage bans did not extend this far. Some states had so
called “marriage evasion” laws that refused recognition to marriages by their own
residents who left the state for the express purpose of evading a marriage restriction. But
very few other marriage bans prohibited recognition, in addition to celebration, of
prohibited marriages.
Within this general framework, state approaches to marriage recognition fell along a
spectrum, but the general tilt of the landscape was in favor of recognition. The exceptions
were recited often but rarely applied in court rulings. And the prorecognition stance has
largely persisted to the modern day—until the controversy over samesex marriage arose.
For example, most states do not allow couples to establish commonlaw marriages, but
most nonetheless will give effect to a commonlaw marriage that was validly created
elsewhere.
What about more controversial marriages? Many states historically refused to license
interracial marriages. But those bans were never universal—in other words, there were
always states that allowed such marriages. When interracial couples married in one state
and then moved to another, the destination states often gave effect to the marriages. They
did this even though the celebration bans reflected deeply held views about the
impropriety of interracial love, marriage, and reproduction. It was understood that a state
could continue to prohibit a particular kind of marriage, despite sometimes recognizing
one formed out of state. Interestingly, states that generously afforded recognition to out
ofstate marriages were no quicker to eliminate particular marriage impediments under
their own laws than those that were stingier about granting such recognition.
Whether an outofstate marriage was given effect was courts recognized a particular out
ofstate marriage or not was a question for courts to decide on an individualized basis.
Couple by couple. Marriage by marriage. Reason for recognition by reason for
recognition. These cases did not always result in recognition, but they often did. The law
developed that way to allow states to coexist and to avoid the chaotic and complicated
results that would stem from having a couple’s marital status change each time they cross
a state border.
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/28/interstatemarriagerecognitionwhenhistorymeetsthesupremecourt
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Throughout the twentieth century, the exceptions to the placeofcelebration rule became
less important because the most controversial marriage laws—those banning interracial
marriage—were struck down by the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia
(https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/388/1/case.html) in 1967 under the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. During the
same era, other state marriage laws converged as the result of changing social norms that
affected decisions about which individuals and couples could and could not marry. These
changes coincided with the increasing mobility of the American people, who had greater
ability than ever before to travel across state lines and to move from state to state. The
portability of marriage became more important, not less.
The cases on marriage recognition cite four primary reasons for giving effect to
prohibited outofstate marriages: to provide stability and predictability to families, to
promote marital responsibility, to facilitate interstate travel, and to protect private
expectations. It was widely understood that a system that leaned against recognition
would devastate many couples, as well as their children. Given the hundreds of important
things that hinge on marital status—parentage of children, eligibility for spousal benefits
from private employers and public benefit programs, property and inheritance rights,
medical decisions, and hospital visitation rights, to name a few—denying a couple’s
marital status is not something that should be done lightly.
Marriage Recognition in the SameSex Marriage Context
The relative calm that characterized marriage law during the second half of the twentieth
century was upended by two competing developments—laws in some states allowing
samesex couples to marry and laws in other states refusing to recognize those marriages.
In reaction to early indications that at least some states might begin to recognize
marriages between individuals of the same sex, a number of states adopted statutory and
constitutional bans on the recognition of marriages by samesex couples. These laws—
some of which are being challenged in the case currently before the Court—are at best
unusual. As the discussion above notes, seldom did a state categorically ban recognition
of an entire class of marriages, even those marriages that were thought to be truly
unacceptable.
Whatever their motivation, the categorical restrictions on recognizing samesex
marriages fundamentally altered the terrain of marriage recognition law, which
previously turned on individualized determinations by courts and tended towards
recognition rather than against. But these new recognition laws shift decisionmaking
power from courts to legislatures and shift the analysis from individual to categorical.
And, unlike many traditional marriage laws, they draw no distinction between evasive
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/28/interstatemarriagerecognitionwhenhistorymeetsthesupremecourt
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prohibited marriages and nonevasive ones (which were the most likely to be given effect
in other states). Moreover, enshrining these bans in state constitutions, which was done
to avoid judicial review by state courts, is yet another feature that treads new ground.
When History Meets Supreme Court Precedent
What is the relevance of the history of interstate marriage recognition law to the case
before the Court? In United States v. Windsor
(https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/570/12307/) (2013), in which the
Supreme Court invalidated the provision of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
that refused federal recognition to validly celebrated samesex marriages, the Court took
note of history. There, it noted the federal government’s longstanding practice of
deferring to state law for purposes of maritalstatus determination. For example, a couple
can file a joint federal tax return if they are considered legally married under state law; if
not, they cannot. The same holds for benefits as varied as Social Security and evidentiary
privileges in federal criminal prosecutions.
The Court in Windsor thus deemed the federallaw provision of DOMA to be a
discrimination of an “unusual character” that warranted “careful consideration” of its
constitutionality and raised a strong inference of impermissible animus under the Equal
Protection Clause. It based this analysis on an earlier case involving sexual orientation
discrimination, Romer v. Evans
(https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/517/620/case.html) (1996), in which
the Court struck down a voter referendum in Colorado that was deemed so unusual it
could only have resulted from hostility to gays and lesbians, an historically disadvantaged
group.
The question before the Supreme Court in Obergefell, then, is whether the state bans on
recognition of samesex marriages from other states constitute discrimination of an
“unusual character” that raise the same suspicions the Court had of the federallaw
provision of DOMA. If the Court answers the first question in favor of the plaintiffs (and
rules that bans on the celebration of samesex marriages are unconstitutional) it will
likely not reach the recognition question independently. But recognition questions have
always been governed by an independent body of law and merit their own analysis here.
We will have our answer at the end of June, when the Court traditionally releases its most
important decisions.
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